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Federally Funded Stem Cell
Research: A Good Deal for the
Taxpayer and Consumer?
Don Allen Resnikoff*
On August 9, 2001, President Bush announced
that he would allow federal taxpayer money to be used
for medical research on stem cells from human embryos.
He limited research to cells previously extracted from
embryos and said that he would not support the destruction of new embryos.
The public debate that followed the President's
announcement has focused mainly on the ethical issues
of research using cells from human embryos, and
whether the President's limitation of research to previously extracted stem cells will make enough stem cell
"lines" available to researchers at a reasonable price.
There is relatively little discussion in the media of pragmatic taxpayer and consumer issues. Is federal funding
likely to be efficiently used? Is it likely to create medical
benefits for the public? More specifically, will government owned or funded patents result from stem cell
research, and should private companies get exclusive
rights to develop the government patents? If companies
get exclusive rights, should the prices for the resulting
privately marketed medicines and procedures be regulated? Should companies with exclusive rights be regulated to assure they do a good job developing and commercializing patented inventions?
There has been some media discussion of whether
federal funding will be well used. In an Op-Ed piece in
the August 31, 2001 edition of the New York Times,
computer entrepreneur Jim Clark said that the limitations
President Bush has put on federal financing of stem cell
research will cause harm, and urged that federal financing be offered with fewer restrictions:
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Denying financing for this biomedical [stem cell]
research will drive the formation of a new pharmaceutical industry outside the United States. Federally funded research helped create America's economic leadership in the Internet and computer
technology. It led to the formation of companies
like Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, Cisco and
Netscape. Restricting stem cell research for even a
few years simply means that scientists in the United
States will not be pioneers. Others will own the
patents and claims, and a new pharmaceutical industry will thrive elsewhere. I believe our country
risks being thrown into a dark age of medical research.'
Mr. Clark wants the federal government to provide research seed money to promote segments of the
American pharmaceutical industry. He believes this is a
wise investment in American economic leadership.
But is Mr. Clark right? Will American taxpayers
and consumers really benefit from the government investment in industry that Mr. Clark advocates?
Mr. Clark's views represent one side of a broader
set of taxpayer and consumer issues concerning the
wisdom of the government's funding of research and
development that aids the U.S. biotechnology industry
(as well as other industries). Controversy surrounds the
current U.S. government policy of patenting medically
significant biological inventions developed by government scientists or funded with federal money, and then
frequently turning them over to private companies for
development, often on an exclusive basis.
One reason for controversy is that private companies that receive exclusive rights to exploit government
owned or funded patents may charge high prices for the
resulting medical products. Critics of private exploitation
of publicly funded biotech inventions say that taxpayers
may pay twice, first to sponsor the invention and then to
Volume 14, Number I 2001

Loyola Consumer Law Review

buy the patented medication or device. Another reason
for controversy is that companies that receive exclusive
rights may find it in their interests to develop and commercialize the government patent very slowly. Where
rights are exclusive, there are no competing companies to
challenge the laggard's protected market position.
The main defense for the government policy is
that commercial development of medically significant
biological inventions is expensive, so private companies
would not perfect important medical advances unless the
government turned over valuable patent rights. The
argument is that exclusive rights create social benefit by
encouraging private companies to develop technologies
that would otherwise languish.
Debate about patents and private exploitation of
government owned or sponsored medical inventions
often is between experts and excludes the general public.
The debaters are most often specialists in government
biotech research policy or law. The debate takes place
largely in academic journals and at scholarly meetings,
and sometimes in Congressional hearings. Occasionally,
activists like Ralph Nader and his colleague James Love
(head of the Consumer Project on Technology--an advocacy group founded by Ralph Nader) do get involved
and the debate becomes more public.
To better understand the debate about private
exploitation of government owned or sponsored inventions and to draw the connection to stem cell research, a
non-specialist should know something about the basics
of stem cell research, and the laws that are the basis for
the U.S. government policy of patenting its inventions
and turning them over to private industry for exploitation. Also, knowledge of past controversies aids understanding.
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I. Stem Cell 101
The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") provides a primer to help the public understand the medical
potential of stem cell research.2 The primer explains that
so-called human "pluripotent" stem cells (cells capable of
self-renewal, as well as differentiation into one or more
subsets of mature, specialized cells) are important to
science and to advances in health care:
At the most fundamental level, pluripotent stem
cells could help us to understand the complex
events that occur during human development. A
primary goal of this work would be the identification of the factors involved in the cellular decisionmaking process that results in cell specialization.
We know that turning genes on and off is central
to this process, but we do not know much about
these 'decision-making' genes or what turns them
on or off. Some of our most serious medical conditions, such as cancer and birth defects, are due to
abnormal cell specialization and cell division. A
better understanding of normal cell processes will
allow us to further delineate the fundamental errors that cause these often deadly illnesses.3
The NIH primer explains that stem cell research
could improve therapeutic drug development and testing. New methods could be developed for testing new
medications using human cell lines, something that is
already done in a limited way.5
A more ambitious goal of stem cell research is the
generation of cells and tissue that could be used for
so-called "cell therapies." 6 The NIH primer explains that
stem cells "offer the possibility of a renewable source of
replacement cells and tissue to treat a myriad of diseases,
conditions, and disabilities including Parkinson's and
Alzheimer's diseases, spinal cord injury, stroke, bums,
Volume 14, Number 1 2001
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heart disease, diabetes, osteoarthritis and rheumatoid
arthritis." 7 An example is development of healthy heart
muscle cells from stem cells for transplant into the failing
heart muscles of patients with chronic heart disease.'
According to the NIH primer, "preliminary work in mice
and other animals has demonstrated that healthy heart
muscle cells transplanted into the heart successfully
repopulate the heart tissue and work together with the
host cells. These experiments show that this type of
transplantation is feasible." 9
The stem cell research described in the NIH
primer could lead to new medical procedures or medications of commercial value to drug companies. Where the
new medical procedures or medications are owned or
funded by the U.S. government, federal laws apply
which provide for private commercial exploitation of the
biotech inventions. For the purposes of those laws, stem
cell research is the same as other biotechnology research
which may lead to new medical procedures or
medications.

II. The Law of Technology Transfer
Maria C. Freire, Ph.D., Director of the NIH Office
of Technology Transfer, briefly outlined some basic relevant federal laws when she testified to a Senate Subcommittee in January, 1999.10 She explained that Congress
enacted a series of laws that encourage government
owned and funded research laboratories to pursue the
commercialization of the results of their research. The
laws are the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the StevensonWydler Innovation Act of 1980, and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 ("FTTA"). 11
The "Bayh-Dole Act
addresses intellectual property rights in federally funded
grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements, while
Stevenson-Wydler and the TA address intellectual
property of government laboratories."12 Ms. Freire explained that "these laws allow government laboratories
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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and the recipients of government funding to elect to
retain title to their inventions. They also impose certain
obligations: promoting utilization, encouraging commercialization and ensuring public availability of these
13
technologies."
When Jack Brock of the U.S. General Accounting
Office discussed the relevant law in Congressional testimony in July, 2001,'14 he explained that the Bayh-Dole Act
has evolved over time. In its early years it was applicable
to small rather than large businesses, as well as universities and other nonprofit organizations.1 5 Not until February, 1983 was the Act extended to large businesses by a
Presidential memorandum issued by Ronald Reagan. 6 In
1984, Congress amended the Bayh-Dole Act to cover
outside contractors operating government-owned laboratories as well. 7 In April, 1987, the President issued an
Executive Order which, among other things, required
agencies to promote commercialization in accordance
8
with the 1983 Presidential Memorandum.1
In her Congressional testimony, Maria Freire
illustrated how the Bayh-Dole Act works, using the
example of the stem cell lines licensed by Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") to the Geron
company. 9 (Both entities have been prominent in recent
headlines because of their commercial control of many of
the human cell lines President Bush wishes to be used for
stem cell research.) Ms. Freire explained that early work
at the University of Wisconsin on developing stem cell
lines from non-human primates was federally funded, so
that the patent on the procedure for developing and
maintaining the cells fell under the rules of the BayhDole Act.2 As required by the Act, the invention of the
procedure for developing stem cell lines was disclosed to
the NIH. A patent application was filed by the University
of Wisconsin through WARF, and WARF licensed the
technology to Geron.21 Ms. Freire explained that:
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Because federal funds were used for this non-human primate work, the government has a non-exclusive, royalty-free right to use the patented cells
by or on behalf of the of the government. This
would allow the government laboratories and contractors the right to use the patented cells for further research. In addition, in handling this invention the University must ensure that the goals of
the Bayh-Dole Act utilization, commercialization,
and public availability are implemented.2
Ms. Freire pointed out that when research is funded
entirely by the private sector, Bayh-Dole rules do not
apply, so the government has no license, and availability
to the government of patented information is strictly a
matter of private discretion. 23 That is the case for the
Geron sponsored work on human stem cell lines derived
from human fetuses.24

III. The AZT Controversy
AZT, a drug for fighting the AIDS virus, is perhaps
the best known "poster child" story for those who believe
private commercialization of government funded research leads to drugs that are too scarce and too costly,
and who advocate government price regulation as a
response.
Critics have excoriated patent holder Wellcome
(now Glaxo because of a corporate acquisition) for years
for profiting excessively from a medical patent that
depended to a significant extent on government effort
and protection. The September 15, 1989 Wall Street
Journal 25 reported that activists in San Francisco, London
and New York staged demonstrations attacking
Burroughs Wellcome and its parent, London-based
Wellcome PLC, as corporate extortionists. The Journal
article explained that "[t]he company is accused by
activists and some health-care providers of reaping
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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unseemly profits from AIDS patients and federally
funded Medicaid by keeping the price of AZT, or
azidothymidine, at a level that makes it one of the most
expensive drugs ever sold-about $8,000 for a year's
supply per patient."26
With regard to the federal government's role in
inventing AZT, the Journal reported that critics believe
that AZT profits are a windfall for the company.27 Critics
say Wellcome "didn't create the compound, it wasn't the
first to discover its effectiveness against AIDS-type
'retroviruses,' it didn't uncover its effectiveness against
AIDS itself and it didn't conduct the first human tests."
Much of that work was done by federally financed NIH
scientists.28
Representative Waxman, a California Democrat,
held Congressional hearings on AZT's price in early
1987.29 A few years later he reportedly wrote to Wellcome,
saying that the continued high price of the drug "appears
to be an attempt to charge whatever patients, governments and insurers can scrape together because they are
desperate and have no alternative." 30 He said that was
inappropriate in light of all the government help
Wellcome received, and warned that his subcommittee
on health and the environment might reopen hearings
into AZT's price.3 '
Complaints about AZT pricing have continued
through the years. Reporter Gregory Palast, writing in
the July 27, 2000 issue of the Guardian about drug company pricing policies toward poor Africans, had harsh
words about Wellcome, saying that "Glaxo [Wellcome]
was inventive, all right, but not in discovering AZT."32
In recent years arguments directed against AZT's high
prices have expanded to include new anti-AIDS drugs,
such as the drug stavudine, a Bristol-Myers product sold
under the brand name Zerit. The Seattle Times for June
13, 2001, reported that:
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James Love, a Seattle native and head of the Consumer Project on Technology-an advocacy group
founded by Ralph Nader-is pushing for the creation of a nonprofit company to license the rights
to make and sell a low-cost version of d4T
[stavudine], a widely used AIDS drug sold by
Bristol-Meyers, for $10 a day in the U.S. Known as
Zerit, it was discovered by government-sponsored
research at Yale, which has a deal with the com33
pany.
Love reportedly argues that "a provision of the 1980
Bayh-Dole Act, which regulates a private company's use
of federally funded research, requires the federal government to issue a compulsory license when a company's
profits are deemed excessive in the face of people's
needs, provided tax money was used in the research."'
The long range goal of a group associated with Mr.
Love, Public Citizen, is broader government price regulation of drugs that benefit from government funding.
Public Citizen's July 23, 2001 publication called "Rx R&D
Myths: The Case Against The Drug Industry's R&D
'Scare Card"' argues for price regulation for private
company drugs that have benefited from taxpayerfunded research.35
In the 1980s, and more recently, the result of public
agitation alleging price gouging in the sale of AZT and
other anti-AIDS drugs has been some moderation in drug
prices. Recently large drug companies have effectively
lowered the price of AIDS drugs sold to people in poor
nations in Africa and elsewhere.36
The AZT story illustrates the debates about drug
company pricing that could erupt should federally financed stem cell research lead to patented medical products. Fairness requires the observation that the limited
nature of Glaxo-Wellcome's role as inventor of AZT is not
so plain as critics suggest. As a matter of patent law (as
opposed to broader equitable argument), the courts have
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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decided that for the most part the role of government
scientists did not give them (or their employer, the U.S.
37
government) the rights of co-inventors.

IV. The Cellpro Controversy
The Cellpro controversy involved narrow but
bitterly contested patent disputes. It also involved argument about the need for government regulation of companies that hold exclusive rights to government owned
or funded patents, and which are alleged to be laggards
in developing the patents.
The patent dispute in Cellpro concerned rights to
rival procedures for separating immature from mature
stem cells. The immature cells were useful for the purpose of replacing damaged bone marrow in cancer patients who had received radiation treatments. The mature
cells caused rejection problems, so procedures were
developed for separating them. Federal funding contributed to one of the two rival procedures.
The separation procedure that was first to be
patented was a federally funded invention made by a
scientist at Johns Hopkins University. The patent for the
invention was owned by the University and licensed
exclusively to Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter).
The patents owned by Cellpro were issued later. Simply
stated, the argument of the Hopkins/Baxter patent infringement lawsuit against Cellpro was that because the
Hopkins/Baxter patents had priority in time, and were
overlapped by the Cellpro patents, Cellpro's use of its
separation procedures infringed the Hopkins/Baxter
patent and should be stopped. To a large extent,
Hopkins/Baxter prevailed in the courts over Cellpro's
patent law arguments.m
Cellpro supplemented its defense of the Hopkins/
Baxter patent litigation by complaining to the federal
government and requesting that the government use its
authority against Hopkins/Baxter under the Bayh-Dole
Volume 14, Number 1 2001
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Act. Cellpro wanted the government to "march in" and
require that the federally funded Hopkins/Baxter stem
cell separation technology be made more freely available
to others, including itself. Cellpro asserted that federal
action was necessary to alleviate health and safety needs,
because the federal court had enjoined sale of the commercially available Cellpro stem cell separation device at
a time when the equivalent Hopkins/Baxter device was
not yet widely available for purchase. Cellpro alleged
that Hopkins/Baxter had failed to take reasonable steps
to commercialize their device, so that Cellpro was the
only one of the two that had a commercially available
FDA approved device.
In 1997, the NIH, which was responsible for deciding the Cellpro petition, decided against "marching in."39
It reasoned there was no threat to patient health or safety
because Baxter had pledged in the course of patent infringement litigation to refrain from fully enforcing
patent rights. 4° The Court had entered an order making
unlikely the "loss of availability of the Cellpro
product. ' 41 Any possible loss of availability would be
only for the brief period until the Hopkins/Baxter product was approved by the FDA.42 Moreover, medical
efficacy of the separation devices was unclear, so availability of separation devices was of questionable value to
patient well being.43
With regard to the allegation that Baxter had failed
to commercialize the cell separation technology, the NIH
found that Baxter had proceeded with reasonable speed,
even if it lagged behind Cellpro. 44
The NIH decision articulated an enforcement
philosophy of avoiding Bayh-Dole march-in for fear of
discouraging private company exploitation of government inventions:
We are wary; however, of forced attempts to influence the marketplace for the benefit of a single company, particularly when such actions may have farLoyola ConsumerLaw Review
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reaching repercussions on many companies' and
investors' future willingness to invest in federally
funded medical technologies.... In exercising its
authorities under the Bayh-Dole Act, NIH is mindful of the broader public health implications of a
march-in proceeding, including the potential loss
of new health care products yet to be developed
from federally funded research. 45
The NIH did not exercise its Bayh-Dole march in
authority in the Cellpro matter and, indeed, scholars that
have studied the question say that NIH has never used
its march in authority in any matter.46
The Cellpro story suggests the possibility of future
debates where government sponsored stem-cell based
medical research results in a patent. Where patent rights
are given to a private company on an exclusive basis,
disputes may arise about whether the company is diligently developing and commercializing the patent.
Competitors or consumers may argue that exclusivity has
made the beneficiary company lazy and slow to develop
and commercialize a patented product or process. Complainants may argue that the exclusivity should be broken by the sponsoring government agency and the patent
shared with other companies.

V. The Ongoing Debate
There plainly are problems with a government
policy of patenting government owned or funded inventions and giving exclusive rights to the patents to private
companies. Some comments by scholars help pinpoint
the problems. Rebecca Eisenberg, a professor and frequent consultant to the government, offers an overview,
explaining that:
Today, we have in place a system that pervasively
promotes patenting federally-sponsored inventions
Volume 14, Number 1 2001
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wherever they are made, whether in government,
university, or private laboratories. Current law presumes that anyone involved in the research project
who wants the discovery to be patented should
prevail over the objections of anyone who thinks
the discovery should be placed in the public domain, absent exceptional circumstances .... Only
in exceptional circumstances does the statute acknowledge that there may be an affirmative case
for putting a discovery in the public domain for
the greater social good.47
Professor Eisenberg says that "this is a
counterintuitive policy in a number of respects." 4 First,
allowing private firms to hold exclusive rights to inventions that have been generated at public expense requires
the public to pay twice for the same invention, "once
through taxes to support the research that yielded the
invention, and then again through higher monopoly
prices and restricted supply when the invention reaches
the market." 49Second, giving companies exclusive rights
in existing publicly funded inventions is something like
giving patent rights on existing inventions, which results
in a net social loss. 50 That is because giving exclusive
rights to an existing invention may cause prices to go up
but yields no beneficial new invention. Third, "by promoting the private appropriation of federally-sponsored
research discoveries as a matter of routine, it calls into
question the public goods rationale for public funding of
research." 51And fourth, "by providing incentives to
patent and restrict access to discoveries made in institutions that have traditionally been the principal performers of basic research, it threatens to impoverish the public
domain of research science that has long been an important resource for researchers in both the public and private sectors." 2
Scholar Nathan Adams is similarly unenthusiastic
about transfer of government patents to private compaLoyola Consumer Law Review
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nies. He complains that it is bad industrial policy and
bad economics for the U.S. government to fund medical
research and development that leads to patents for private firms.5 3 He says that the policy will do more harm to
the U.S. economy than good, for three reasons: (1) the
policy causes the government to "choose commercial
winners" and support some business efforts, but not
others; (2) it creates opportunities for fraud and pork
barrel politics, and (3) it encourages markets dominated
T 4
by a few companies (an oligopoly) charging high prices.
Adams' "choosing winners" complaint is similar
to the observation made by Professor Eisenberg. By
granting some corporations within an industry exclusive
rights to public knowledge, in effect the federal government "blesses them twice at the expense of other corporations ...once with funds for research and development
'55
and a second time with monopoly pricing rights.
The "fraud and pork barrel politics point" is that
many government grants are likely to be politically
expedient rather than economically wise. Adams argues
with regard to Bayh-Dole type grants that "federal laboratories tend to interact predominantly with only a few,
interested private and public entities ....56
Adams' point about high prices charged by a few
large companies is that Bayh-Dole type government
largesse typically encourages only a small coterie of
companies by giving them exclusive rights. Adams feels
that leads to great market concentration, an oligopoly, in
particular products and processes.
A recent National Research Council report commented wistfully on the problem of patenting of government inventions, even as the report strongly endorsed
public funding of stem cell research and a strong focus on
basic research.57 The report says that "[elven patenting of
publicly funded research need not be a deterrent to
progress if such patented research is licensed with terms
that enable broad dissemination ....58 The report gives
an example of certain patented DNA research that was
Volume 14, Number 1 2001
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widely disseminated by a group of universities on a
voluntary basis. Involuntary dissemination is seen as
unlikely, because the government's limited Bayh-Dole
authority to compel dissemination is "never exercised."59
The scholars teach us that there are two views on
the current government policy of patenting the results of
government research and often giving exclusive rights to
private companies. One is the view pointedly noted by
Adams: the policy causes the government to support
some business efforts, but not others, and creates opportunities for non-objective decision making and favoritism
toward a handful of large companies.
Adams' view is, of course, contrary to the view of
Jim Clark, the Op-Ed author, and others. They believe it
is wise industrial policy for the government to fund
research that results in patents that are often turned over
to particular companies for development. Harold
Varmus, who supported use of exclusive licenses as head
of NIH, argued that "[it is well documented that technologies with potential as therapeutics are rarely developed into products without some form of [private company] exclusivity, given the large development costs
associated with bringing the product to the market. No
benefit accrues to the public if the technology is left to
languish and no product reaches the marketplace." Dr.
Varmus explained that while government licensing
strategy gives preference to nonexclusive licenses so that
market competition and broad distribution are fostered,
"[e]xclusive licenses are granted when such rights are
believed to be necessary to ensure product development."60
The difference between the two views is not one of
black and white, but one of balancing any broad social
benefits of exclusive licensing against any harm. Differences of opinion may turn on whether one trusts government people to analyze an undeveloped technology and
predict that giving an exclusive license will create an
important benefit to society and avoid the languishing of
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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technology that Dr. Varmus fears. Skeptics may doubt the
value of such predictions, and think it better for the
government to rely strongly on non-exclusive licenses
that bring the beneficial forces of commercial competition
into play.
The scholars' discussion reminds us that the AZT
and Cellpro type issues of regulation of price and patent
rights follow the most basic analytical question of
whether government patents should be transferred to
private companies for exclusive exploitation. It is only if
the answer is "yes" that companies can rely on patent
exclusivity and any resulting market power to charge
high prices, as was alleged in the AZT controversy, or
justify being overly cautious in commercially developing
government patents, as was alleged in the Cellpro controversy. If the answer is "no," and companies get no exclusive rights, then there are diminished opportunities for
companies to charge high prices and go slowly in developing products, largely because there may be competition between companies with non-exclusive rights. Rivalry among competitors should automatically provide
incentives to low prices and rapid commercial development of valuable patents. In a competitive environment
there is relatively little need for regulatory discussion
about government control of pricing and patent rights of
companies. That is important, because equitable government price regulation can be very difficult to accomplish.
Government regulation of the timeliness of a company's
product development and commercial exploitation is
more difficult yet.

VI. Conclusion
Stem cell research is part of a broader debate about
the efficacy of federal funding for research that is often
privately exploited for commercial gain. There is debate
in some circles about whether it is wise industrial and
economic policy for the government to selectively fund
Volume 14, Number 1 2001
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research leading to patents that are turned over to particular companies for exclusive commercial development.
Such funding may be bad economics and bad industrial
policy, and generate troublesome regulatory issues of
whether private companies that benefit from exclusive
rights should be subject to government price controls and
other remedies where commercialization is slow. Avoiding exclusivity and relying on competitive commercialization of patents should automatically lead to low prices
and rapid commercial development of valuable patents,
and make unnecessary government regulation of price
and the pace of commercialization.
There is likely to be future debate about exclusive
commercial exploitation of the results of stem cell research. The sooner and more public that debate, the
better the chances for wise and balanced public policy.
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